Sever — Operational Continuity Disruption
Disrupt the platform’s ability to sustain operations.
Classification
| Attribute | Value |
|---|---|
| Type | Active — alters target state |
| Target | SENSE → DECIDE → ACT loop continuity |
| Effect | Platform cannot sustain its operational loop |
| Phases | Primarily Phase E (Engagement) |
| Hardening Viability | Tier 0-2: viable. Tier 3: reduced but not eliminated — physics cannot be patched |
Definition
Sever disrupts the platform’s ability to sustain its SENSE → DECIDE → ACT loop as a continuous operation. Where Mirage corrupts SENSE, Fracture corrupts DECIDE, and Override corrupts ACT, Sever degrades the coherence and continuity of the entire loop.
Three domains:
- Resource exhaustion — deplete finite consumables faster than the mission plan accounts for
- Communication denial — sever links between the platform and its operator, GCS, or peers
- Timing disruption — desynchronize coordinated operations
The common thread: the loop may be individually intact at each stage, but the system as a whole can no longer sustain operations.
Domain 1: Resource Exhaustion
Every platform operates on a finite energy budget. Sever forces higher-consumption states, collapsing the budget ahead of schedule.
Power Budget Exploitation
| Technique | Mechanism | Target |
|---|---|---|
| VTOL motor forcing | Trigger failsafes that engage VTOL motors during cruise | VTOL hybrids with separate battery systems |
| Hover trapping | Force into hover via GPS denial or mode injection | Multirotor and VTOL platforms |
| Altitude cycling | Repeated climb/descent via threshold manipulation | Any platform with altitude-hold logic |
For platforms with separate VTOL and cruise batteries, forcing VTOL motor engagement during fixed-wing flight drains the VTOL packs at 10-15x the cruise power rate. When voltage drops below the critical threshold, the platform executes a forced landing regardless of remaining cruise battery.
The platform defeats itself. You are making its safety systems work against its mission.
Domain 2: Communication Denial
RF jamming severs communication links between the platform and external systems.
Jamming Modes
| Mode | Mechanism | Effect |
|---|---|---|
| Broadband noise | High-power noise across target band | Denies all communication. Indiscriminate |
| Targeted jamming | Noise on specific frequency/channel | Denies target link, minimizes collateral |
| Protocol-aware | Transmit during target’s receive windows only | Lower power, harder to detect |
Communication denial triggers comm-loss failsafe behavior. For autonomous platforms (mission continues on RC/GCS loss), jamming alone may not terminate the mission — it isolates the platform from operator override. Tactically useful when combined with other categories: jam the control link (Sever) while spoofing GPS (Mirage) to redirect an isolated platform.
ASTRA acknowledges communication denial as a baseline technique that existing systems (JCREW/DRAKE, MADIS, LMADIS) already provide. ASTRA’s value proposition is precision exploitation, not brute-force denial — but jamming remains a valid Sever technique in the toolkit.
Legal Note
RF jamming is heavily regulated. Intentional interference is prohibited outside authorized military or law enforcement operations in most jurisdictions.
Domain 3: Timing Disruption
Multi-platform operations depend on synchronized timing. Disrupting timing coherence degrades coordinated behavior without necessarily affecting individual operation.
| Technique | Mechanism | Effect |
|---|---|---|
| GPS time spoofing | Spoof GPS time-of-week to create clock offsets | Coordinated maneuvers desynchronize |
| Mesh latency injection | Inject delays into inter-platform communication | Real-time coordination degrades |
| Coordination clock drift | Gradually offset individual clocks | Cumulative desynchronization |
Forward-positioned capability. Current single-platform targets do not require timing attacks. Becomes primary as swarm operations mature.
Sever vs. Hardening
| Hardening | Impact on Sever |
|---|---|
| Larger battery | Extends time-to-effect, does not eliminate |
| Anti-jam waveforms | Increases jammer power requirement |
| Autonomous operation (no comm dependency) | Communication denial becomes irrelevant |
| Authenticated timing | Timing disruption requires defeating authentication |
| Redundant power | Requires exhausting multiple systems |
Sever is the most durable active category because it exploits physics rather than protocol weaknesses. You can encrypt a communication link. You cannot encrypt a battery.